Introduction
In this chapter, we will compare and contrast two rival accounts of the nature of knowing. According to the first, arguably presupposed by the JTB account of knowledge and by attempts to repair or replace it in the postGettier literature, knowing is a metaphysical alloy which, at least in principle, can be 'factored' into mental components (such as believing) and non-mental components (such as the truth of the proposition known). This account of the nature of knowing isn't immediately incompatible with the claim that knowledge is a mental state, if the latter claim is suitably domesticated. One might propose that knowing is a species of believing -to know is to have a belief that meets further conditions -and so counts as a mental state in a derivative sense. This claim enjoys some initial plausibility, not shared by parallel claims about other metaphysical alloys. As Nagel (2013: 281) points out, a murder is a metaphysical alloy, involving mental components (certain intentions) and a decidedly nonmental component (the death of the victim). She notes that there's no plausibility at all in the suggestion that a murder is a mental event, even though it involves a mental component, namely the relevant ill intentions. However, there's also no plausibility whatsoever in the suggestion that murder is a species of intention; it's much more natural to think of a homicide first and foremost as a death, one distinguished from other kinds of deaths in having been brought about intentionally. In contrast, there seems to be something quite natural about the suggestion that when we turn our attention to knowing, it's the believing that's in some sense primary, and the non-mental components serve to distinguish knowing from merely believing. In this relaxed sense, we might even think of believing truly as a mental state (Williamson 2000: 28) .
When Williamson advances the claim that knowing is a mental state, he is adamant that his claim is not to be interpreted in any such 'liberal' fashion (2000: 21-2). His thesis is that there is a mental state that is not only necessary for knowing but also sufficient . In this sense, knowing is a purely mental state; there's no sense in which knowing contrasts unfavourably, in respect of mentality, with believing, desiring, or even feeling pain (e.g., 2000: 6, 28). As Williamson seems aware (2000: 21), this is a surprising claim, given that knowing is a factive state. Moreover, this full-blooded interpretation of the claim that knowing is a mental state really does seem to be in tension with the claim that knowing is an alloy of mental and non-mental components. This is the second of the two accounts of knowing that we will consider in this chapter.
How are we to understand the metaphysical metaphors being appealed to here? Williamson doesn't explicitly say, preferring to appeal to the contrast with believing truly to give them content (2000: 28; cf. Hyman 2006: 891) . Believing truly isn't a purely mental state, as it has a non-mental component (namely truth). The state of believing truly is a metaphysical hybrid or alloy of a purely mental component (belief) and a non-mental component (truth), and so on. Williamson's opponents (such as myself) take believing truly to provide a model of how to think about the nature of knowing; Williamson takes it to provide an illuminating contrast. This will prove to be of considerable significance below.
Clearly, these two accounts of knowing are not exhaustive. One might, for example, hold that knowledge is not a metaphysical alloy in the manner suggested by the first, while also denying that knowledge is a purely mental state. Still, the debate so far has largely been conducted in terms of the two polar views just characterized, and I'll follow it in that regard here, though I'll note when the gap between them becomes relevant.
This chapter divides into three principal sections. In the first, we will briefly look at how Williamson develops his picture of knowing as a mental state. In the second section, we will examine the arguments that have been put forward for the more robust interpretation of the thesis that knowing is a mental state; while in the third, we will turn to objections to the thesis, on that robust interpretation.
Knowing as the most general factive mental state
If the concept of knowledge is unanalysable, and knowing itself is a simple, purely mental state, can we say anything else about knowledge
